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TOBACCO LITIGATION: MEDICAID THIRD PARTY LIABILITY AND CLAIMS
FOR RESTITUTION
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 23, 1994, Mississippi Attorney General Mike Moore filed suit
against major tobacco manufacturers' in an attempt to recover state Medicaid
expenditures.2 Although previous attempts to impose liability on the tobacco
industry had met with failure, Attorney General Moore hoped that by
substituting the state as plaintiff, in place of the individual tobacco user, the
traditional tobacco industry defense of assumption of the risk, or some
variation thereof, might be bypassed.3 Whereas the individual smoker often
presents an isolated, unsympathetic figure, the plaintiff state appeals to
common economic concerns. Thus, pointing to the costs incurred by
Medicaid in treating tobacco related illness and disease, the state asserts an
equitable claim for restitution, independent of the tobacco user.4 Since the
filing of this landmark suit, twenty states have followed with similar actions,
and numerous others stand poised to follow suit.5  This unprecedented
assault on a wholly legitimate industry has potentially wide ranging
application. Therefore, a considered and thorough examination of the
reasoning underlying this theory of liability is necessary.
II. TOBACCO LITIGATION
Tobacco litigation is often divided into three distinct phases: (1) cases
arising from the publicity surrounding early medical reports regarding
tobacco's effect on health; (2) cases filed following the success of asbestos
litigants in the 1970s; and (3) the current suits alleging an industry wide
1. The major tobacco companies are The American Tobacco Co., Liggett Group, Inc.,
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Philip Morris, Inc., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
Lorillard Tobacco Co., and United States Tobacco Co. These companies, along with tobacco
trade associations, The Council for Tobacco Research-U.S.A. Inc., and The Tobacco
Institute, Inc., will be referred to collectively as the "tobacco industry" in this comment.
2. Moore ex rel. Mississippi v. American Tobacco Co., No. 94-1429 (Miss. Ch. Ct.
Jackson County filed May 23, 1994).
3. Michael C. Moore & Charles J. Mikhail, The Fight Against Tobacco; A New Attack
on Smoking Using an Old-Time Remedy, 111 DHHS PUB. HEALTH REP. 192, May 1996.
4. Id.
5. Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin have filed Medicaid recovery suits. See infra
note 72. Other states are in the midst of studying similar actions. See, e.g., Alaska to Sue
Tobacco Giants, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 14, 1997, at B2. But see AG Decides Not to Sue
Tobacco Firms to Recover Medicaid-Related Expenses, 5 Health Care Policy Rep. (BNA)
No. 6, at D-44 (Feb. 10, 1997).
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conspiracy to conceal material information.6 This comment does not attempt
a detailed history of tobacco litigation, but notes significant recent restitution
based developments.
A. Preemption
In 1965, Congress passed legislation requiring prominent warnings on
all cigarette packages, advertisements, and billboards.7 This legislation,
commonly known as the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act,
forced manufacturers to include on packages "conspicuous statements"
regarding the adverse effects of tobacco use.' In 1969, Congress again
addressed this area when it passed the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act9
amending the existing labeling act and including a preemption clause.
In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., the Supreme Court held that this
clause preempted all state causes of action directed toward smoking and
health as they related to the advertising or promotion of cigarettes." Thus,
the statute specifically preempted actions founded on a failure to warn of the
dangers of smoking through advertising or promotion. 2 Conversely, actions
premised on state law not related to advertising or promotion of cigarettes,
with respect to health, are not preempted by federal law. 3 Plaintiffs'
6. Jill Hodges, Tobacco Tenacious in the Courtroom; Industry has Flourished Through
Decades of Litigation, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis & St. Paul), Sept. 15, 1996, at 19A.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1996).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (1996). Manufacturers currently use a rotation of four
statements, each preceded by the caption "SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING."
Specifically, the warnings advise (1) "Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease,
Emphysema, And May Complicate Pregnancy," (2) "Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces
Serious Risks to Your Health," (3) "Smoking By Pregnant Women May Result in Fetal
Injury, Premature Birth, And Low Birth Weight," or (4) "Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon
Monoxide." 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1996).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1996). "No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and
health shall be imposed upon State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any
cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act."
Id. Conversely, the 1965 Act has been held to preempt only a requirement that additional
warnings be placed on cigarette packages. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,
519-20 (1992).
10. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
11. Id. at 524.
12. See, e.g., Allgood v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 80 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 300 (1996) (citing Cipollone for the proposition that a plaintiffs
claims based on fraudulent concealment or failure to warn after 1969 are preempted by the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act); Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 884
F. Supp. 1515 (D. Kan. 1995) (holding post-1969 warning claims are preempted);
Greisenbeck v. American Tobacco Co., 897 F. Supp. 815 (D. N.J. 1995) (holding claim of
inadequate warning is preempted).
13. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 528-30. The Court held that claims based on breach of
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attorneys viewed the multiple opinions4 generated by the fractured Court as
an invitation to frame causes of action in terms unrelated to warnings. 5
Defining the practical parameters of preemption will necessarily involve
further litigation.
B. Class Action Litigation
Anti-tobacco forces suffered a setback in Castano v. American Tobacco
Co.'6 when the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected an ambitious attempt
by plaintiffs to obtain class certification for a class comprised of "all
nicotine dependent persons in the United States."' 7 Plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant tobacco companies knew of nicotine's addictive quality and
intentionally used it to hook smokers.' 8 The Fifth Circuit found that the
district court erred in certifying the class, noting both inadequate analysis as
to the effect on potential class members of variations in state laws and
unresolved questions as to whether common issues would predominate over
individual issues.' 9 The court explained that the class "independently
fail[ed] the superiority requirement" of the rules.20 Consequently, the court
reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint.2 '
Most significantly, the court strongly disfavored class action form for
mass tort cases based on "novel" and "untested" theories.22 Although the
class action may better serve the interests of judicial economy, the course
express warranty, fraudulent misrepresentation of a material fact, or conspiracy to
misrepresent facts are not preempted. Id. at 526-30. See also Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 875 P.2d 73 (Cal. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 577 (1994) (holding claim
that advertising featuring Joe Camel illegally targeted minors was not preempted under
Cipollone analysis).
14. Justice Stevens authored the plurality opinion which synthesizes the essential
holding of the Court. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 508. Justice Blackmun wrote an opinion
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Id. at 531 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia penned a dissenting opinion. Id. at 544 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
15. See, e.g., Cantley v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 681 So. 2d 1057 (Ala. 1996) (finding
a claim for fraudulent suppression of facts related to the risks of smoking preempted, but
finding a design defect claim not preempted).
16. 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
17. Id. at 738. This broad group included not only smokers diagnosed as being
nicotine-dependent by medical practitioners, but also smokers who were advised that smoking
would be injurious to their health by medical practitioners and still continued to smoke. Id.
at 737 n.l.
18. Id. at 737.
19. Id. at 740.
20. Id. at 746.
21. Id. at 752.
22. Id. at 737, 747-48.
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litigation may take is speculative and imprecise.23 The court preferred an
approach whereby individual litigants would pursue the new theory, develop
the relevant common and individual issues, and establish general principles
in multiple courts.24 Once this "maturing" process progressed, the propriety
of class certification could be ascertained more easily.25
C. Settlement
On March 15, 1996, the Liggett Corporation,2 6 a major cigarette
manufacturer in the United States, entered into a proposed settlement with
five states.27 The settlement called for Liggett to provide five million dollars
plus a percentage of profits for twenty-five years in return for the states
dropping Liggett from their individual suits seeking Medicaid reimbursement
costs.2" Prior to this agreement, a unified tobacco industry had steadfastly
refused even to discuss settlement. Following the settlement announcement,
anti-tobacco forces mobilized in a concerted effort to capitalize on the
apparent weakness in tobacco industry solidarity. 29 These efforts attempted
to put political pressure on state attorneys general to file suits against
members of the tobacco industry on the basis of Medicaid restitution.3"
23. Id. at 747.
24. Id. at 748.
25. Id. at 747. On November 4, 1996, attorneys in Arkansas filed suit in federal court
under the same theory pursued in Castano hoping to obtain class certification "on behalf of
all Arkansans who have bought and smoked cigarettes" manufactured by the tobacco industry
defendants. Patricia Manson, Smokers Sue, Say Scheme Got Them Hooked, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, Nov. 5, 1996, at lB. Additional private suits have been filed in
Louisiana, New York, California, Maryland, New Mexico, and Washington D.C. Id.
26. Liggett Corp. is controlled by Liggett Group Inc., which is a subsidiary of Brooke
Group Inc. Liggett Settles Suits By Five States Seeking Medicaid Costs Reimbursement, 7
Medicare Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at D-37 (Mar. 22, 1996). Bennett S. LeBow serves as
Chairman, as well as Chief Executive Officer, of the Brooke Group. Id. LeBow has been
orchestrating an attempted takeover of R.J. Reynolds. Id.
27. These states are Florida, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, and West Virginia.
Id.
28. Specifically, the agreement calls for the states to share a million dollar payment up
front, followed by another four million dollars payable over the next ten years. Additionally,
the states will share in a percentage of Liggett's pretax income for the following twenty-five
years. Depending upon how many states join the settlement, the percentage will range from
2.5% to 7.5%. Id.
29. States Rush to File Medicaid Tobacco Suits, 4 WASH. HEALTH WEEK (Atlantic
Information Services, Inc.) No. 20 (June 3, 1996). Keeping in mind that the first of these
Medicaid suits was filed nearly two years prior to this settlement and that only a handful of
states had filed prior to the settlement, within roughly six months following the settlement
another eleven states filed suit. Significantly this was also the period immediately following
the Castano decision.
30. Id. In West Virginia, where Governor Gaston Caperton originally opposed the
MEDICAID THIRD PARTY LIABILITY
Liggett has maintained its renegade posture by negotiating for a possible
deal wherein Liggett is dropped as a defendant in return for turning over
previously unreleased internal documents.3
III. MEDICAID REIMBURSEMENT LEGISLATION
Noting the failure of private plaintiffs in obtaining class certification,
and recalling the Liggett settlement, anti-tobacco organizers turned their
attention to the state as a plaintiff. By virtue of administering Medicaid,32
states are able to assert an interest in tobacco litigation. Specifically, states
claim they are forced to bear the cost of tobacco related health care for
indigents.33 Thus, the state asserts a claim not simply derived from
subrogation, but based on an equitable claim for restitution distinct from
injury suffered by the individual.M
A. Federal Statutory Authority
In enacting Medicaid, Congress provided that the participating states
must include in their administration plan a procedure for recovering funds
from third parties liable for the injuries of Medicaid recipients. 35  This
"restitutionary" principle is not subject to the states' discretion. The
comprehensive scheme adopted by the participating state must include
proper recovery procedures.36
Medicaid suit filed by Attorney General Darrell McGraw, a $200,000 check representing the
first payment to the state from Liggett pursuant to the settlement quickly brought about the
Governor's full support. Caperton Joins Effort to Recoup Medicaid Funds From Tobacco
Firms, 4 Health Care Policy Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at D-35 (April 22, 1996).
31. Michael Grunwald, Cigarette Firm Offering Documents; Liggett Act Could Shake
Industry, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 10, 1997, at F I.
32. The Supreme Court described Medicaid as a cooperative federal-state program
designed to facilitate the provision of medical care to indigents. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp.
Assoc., 496 U.S. 498, 502 (1990).
33. Moore & Mikhail, supra note 3.
34. Moore & Mikhail, supra note 3.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25) (1996). The state plan must take all "reasonable measures
to ascertain the legal liability of third parties." Id.
[I]n any case where such a legal liability is found to exist after medical assistance
has been made available on behalf of the individual and where the amount of
reimbursement the State can reasonably expect to recover exceeds the cost of such
recovery, the State ... will seek reimbursement for such assistance to the extent
of such legal liability ....
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(B) (1996).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25) (1996). See also HCFA State Fiscal Administration Rule,
42 C.F.R. §433.138 (1996).
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This recovery provision does not create a new federal right, but is
dependent on the substantive state law of the jurisdiction in which recovery
is sought.37 If a state does not recognize a particular theory of liability, the
Medicaid statute does not compel the creation of such a right.3" However,
where an action is available under state law, the state is required to pursue
such action against the liable third party.39 The states are free to fashion
more stringent remedies internally.
B. State Statutory Authority
Both Florida and Massachusetts passed third party Medicaid liability
acts of their own in 1994.' Each act sought to increase the ability of the
state to recover from tobacco companies.41  Florida's statute, which
increased potential liability for third parties by extraordinary measures, was
directly attacked by the tobacco industry.42 As Massachusetts's act was not
so far-reaching, the tobacco industry did not challenge the act directly, but
mounted more subtle attacks during proceedings regarding the removal of
Massachusetts's suit to federal court.43
1. Florida's Medicaid Third Party Liability Act
Florida's legislature statutorily eliminated affirmative defenses for
"liable third parties,"" including assumption of the risk and comparative
negligence,45 applied the concept of joint and several liability to any
37. Massachusetts v. Philip Morris Inc., 942 F. Supp. 690, 694 (D. Mass. 1996).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Florida Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910 (West
1996); Massachusetts Third-Party Liability Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 118E, § 22
(West 1996) and 1994 Mass. Acts, ch. 60, § 276.
41. Although neither act on its face is limited to tobacco, Massachusetts specifically
authorizes action "against any liable third party who is a manufacturer of cigarettes .... "
1994 Mass. Acts, ch. 60, § 276. Florida Governor Lawton Chiles issued an executive order
limiting active enforcement of the third part liability act solely to the tobacco industry. Fla.
Exec. Order No. 95-105 (Mar. 28, 1995).
42. Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus., 678 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 1996),
petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3433 (Dec. 5, 1996).
43. Philip Morris Inc., 942 F. Supp. at 691-92.
44. Exactly who fits the definition of "liable third party" is unclear. Whether this
indicates that a third party must be found liable outside of the Medicaid Third Party Liability
Act, or whether this refers to a party found liable after application of the Act presents a
problem of statutory interpretation. See Richard N. Pearson, The Florida Medicaid
Third-Party Liability Act, 46 FLA. L. REv. 609, 613 (1994).
45. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(1) (West 1996). "Principles of common law and equity
as to . . . comparative negligence, assumption of risk, and all other affirmative defenses
[Vol. 19
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recovery,'" eliminated the need to identify individual recipients in large
claims,47 allowed the market share theory of liability,4 eliminated the
defense of statute of repose,49 permitted the use of statistics to prove
causation and damages,'a and permitted treble damages in cases of criminal
violations.51 The act explicitly states that in addition to automatic subroga-
tion to the rights of the Medicaid recipient, the Agency for Health Care
Administration52 has a recovery cause of action independent of any rights of
the Medicaid patient.5" The act immediately raises due process and equal
protection questions when applied.' Concerned over the breadth of this
legislation, Associated Industries of Florida, Inc. immediately filed suit
challenging the constitutionality of the legislation and eventually came
before the Florida Supreme Court."
The court concluded that the abrogation of affirmative defenses was
constitutional on its face, while expressly reserving judgment on whether
such abrogation would survive a challenge as applied.56 The court then
struck down the portion of the act allowing the state to proceed without
identifying individual Medicaid recipients, finding that it created an
untenable violation of procedural due process by statutorily mandating a
presumption that Medicaid payments were properly made, without affording
defendants an opportunity to rebut this presumption.57 Finally, the court
upheld the state's proceeding under joint and several liability or under
market share liability, but prohibited proceeding under both, declaring the
two "fundamentally incompatible." 8
normally available to a liable party, are to be abrogated to the extent necessary to ensure full
recovery by Medicaid from third-party resources; .... " Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. § 409.910(9)(a).
48. Id. § 409.910(9)(b).
49. Id. § 409.910(12)(h).
50. Id. § 409.910(9).
51. Id. § 409.910(19).
52. The Agency for Health Care Administration is an independent agency located within
Florida's Department of Professional Regulation and charged with the regulation of health
care activities in the state. Associated Indus., 678 So. 2d at 1243.
53. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(6) (West 1996).
54. For an excellent discussion illustrating the absurd results possible under this act, see
William W. Van Alstyne, Denying Due Process in the Florida Courts: A Commentary on the
1994 Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act of Florida, 46 FLA. L. REv. 563 (1994).
55. Associated Indus., 678 So. 2d at 1239.
56. Id. at 1243.
57. Id. at 1255-56.
58. Id. at 1556-57.
1997]
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As a result of the Associated Industries ruling, the state must identify
individual recipients of Medicaid, and consequently show causation.59
Following the decision, the state filed an amended complaint against the
tobacco industry.6° On September 16, 1996, Judge Harold Cohen of the
Palm Beach County Circuit Court dismissed fifteen of eighteen claims by
the state, leaving only post-1994 claims for negligence and products liability,
along with a claim for injunctive relief.6' Judge Cohen reasoned that the
1994 amendments to the state third party liability act allowed the state to
pursue an independent action and that claims such as these could not be
brought for events prior to the amendment. 62 The state is still able to seek
restitution for pre-1994 claims pursuant to traditional theories of subroga-
tion.63 The order also required the state to identify, within thirty days, each
individual Medicaid recipient for whom the state seeks recovery of
benefits.' The effect of this order was limited, however, when Judge Cohen
subsequently ruled that the identification numbers of the Medicaid patients
satisfied the state's discovery burden.65 By allowing the state to proceed
without naming the individual Medicaid patients, the court limited tobacco
companies' ability to depose individuals or otherwise attempt to discover
relevant medical information.
2. Massachusetts' Medicaid Third Party Liability Act
Massachusetts's third party recovery act is much less detailed and much
less radical than the one passed by Florida. While the state is expressly
given a "separate and independent cause of action" against "manufacturers
of cigarettes," as well as a subrogation right, no special provisions eliminate
traditional defenses.66 Although the tobacco industry may be able to launch
an equal protection attack against the act's singular specification of cigarette
59. The Florida Supreme Court rejected Associated Industries's request for a rehearing
as to the constitutionality of the abrogation of affirmative defenses in an order entered
Sept. 6, 1996. Florida Supreme Court Denies Rehearing on State's Medicaid Law, 10
Mealey's Litig. Rep.: Tobacco No. 10 (Sept. 19, 1996).
60. Complaint, Florida v. American Tobacco Co., No. CL 95-1466-AO (Fla. Cir. Ct.
Palm Beach County filed Aug. 7, 1996).
61. Many Pre-1994 Claims Dismissed From Florida's Medicaid Recovery Case, 10




65. State Can Submit Patient ID Numbers in Medicaid Reimbursement Suit, Court Says,
4 Health Care Policy Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at D-28 (Oct. 28, 1996).
66. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 118E, § 22 (West 1996) and 1994 Mass. Acts, ch. 60,
§ 276.
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manufacturers, this subject was not addressed by the Massachusetts federal
district court in a memorandum opinion remanding the case back to state
court.
6 7
IV. MEDICAID REIMBURSEMENT ACTIONS
Since May 23, 1994,68 when Mississippi filed the first state claim
attempting to recover from the tobacco industry based on Medicaid
expenditures, numerous other states followed suit.69 County officials filed
similar claims in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, and Los Angeles County,
California, while city officials filed suit in New York City.70 Even the
Health Minister of British Columbia announced plans to file a comparable
suit in Canada.7' Most of these suits have been filed in state circuit courts;72
67. Philip Morris Inc., 942 F. Supp. at 690.
68. Moore ex rel. Mississippi v. American Tobacco Co., No. 94-1429 (Miss. Ch. Ct.
Jackson County filed May 23, 1994).
69. Other states to file Medicaid recovery suits include Arizona, Connecticut, Florida,
Kansas, Louisiana, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
70. New York City v. Tobacco Institute Inc., No. 406225/96 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed
Oct. 17, 1996).
71. Canadian Province Plans to Sue Tobacco Companies, REUTER Bus. REP.,
Sept. 25, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS file.
72. Arizona v. American Tobacco Inc., No. CV96-14769 (Ariz. Super. Ct., Maricopa
County filed Aug. 20, 1996); Connecticut v. Philip Morris Co., (Ct. Super. Ct., Stamford
County filed July 18, 1996); Florida v. American Tobacco Co., No. CL 95-1466-AO (Fla.
Cir. Ct., Palm Beach County filed Feb. 21, 1995); Indiana v. Philip Morris, Inc., (Indiana
Sup. Ct., Marion County filed Feb. 19, 1997); Iowa v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., (Iowa
Dist. Ct., Polk County filed Nov. 27, 1996); Kansas v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No.
96-CV-919 (Kan. Dist. Ct., Shawnee County filed Aug. 20, 1996); Louisiana v. American
Tobacco Co., No. 96-1209 (La. Dist. Ct., Calcasieu Parish filed Mar. 13, 1996); Maryland
v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 96-122017/CL211487 (Md. Cir. Ct., Baltimore City filed May 1,
1996); Massachusetts v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 95-7378 (Mass. Super. Ct., Middlesex
County filed Dec.19, 1995); Michigan v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 96-84281-CZ (Mich. Cir.
Ct., Ingham County filed Aug. 21, 1996); Minnesota v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. C1-94-8565
(Minn. Dist. Ct., Ramsey County filed Aug. 17, 1994); New York v. Philip Morris, Inc., No.
400361/97 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., New York County filed Jan. 27, 1997); Oklahoma v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. CJ-96-1499-4 (Okla. Dist. Ct., Cleveland County filed Aug. 22,
1996); Washington v. American Tobacco Co., No. 96-2-15056-8SEA (Wash. Super. Ct., King
County filed June 5, 1996); West Virginia v. American Tobacco Co., No. 94-1707 (W.Va.
Cir. Ct., Kanawha County filed Sept. 20, 1994); Wisconsin v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 97-CV-
328 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Dane County filed Feb. 5, 1997).
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however, Mississippi and New Jersey filed in their respective chancery
courts.73 Only Texas and Utah brought suit in federal court.74
A. Theories
Although individual complaints vary from state to state, the underlying
theory of recovery is largely the same: plaintiffs accuse the tobacco industry
of conspiring to conceal the addictive nature of nicotine, and causing
increased smoking and extensive smoking related illness and disease.75 The
state then bears the cost of treating these smoking related health problems
through the administration of Medicaid, leading to the unjust enrichment of
tobacco companies.76
Most of the complaints allege the following basic causes of action:
conspiracy, fraud or fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of warranty,
negligent undertaking of a voluntary duty, and most significantly, restitution
and unjust enrichment. Some states include allegations of design defect,77
nuisance,7" and violation of state consumer protection laws. 79 Texas and
Utah have each filed RICO claims. Many of the states seek punitive
damages, along with compensatory damages and equitable remedies aimed
at preventing the sale of cigarettes to minors." While legal theories account
for a significant portion of the litigation, equitable theories of recovery are
the driving force behind the suits.8 '
73. Moore ex. rel. Mississippi v. American Tobacco Co., No. 94-1429 (Miss. Ch. Ct.,
Jackson County filed May 23, 1994); New Jersey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div., Middlesex County filed Sept. 10, 1996).
74. Utah v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 2:96CV-0829W (D. Utah filed Sept. 30,
1996); Texas v. American Tobacco Co., No. 5:96CV91 (E.D. Tex. filed Mar. 28, 1996).
75. Amended Complaint, 1, Florida v. American Tobacco Co., No. CL 95-1466-AO
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Palm Beach County filed Aug. 7, 1996).
76. Id.
77. Mississippi, Texas, Oklahoma, Utah, and Florida. See supra notes 72-74.
78. Mississippi, West Virginia, Utah, Oklahoma, and Iowa. See supra notes 72-74.
79. West Virginia, Utah, Michigan, Oklahoma, Washington, and Iowa.
80. Requests for injunctive relief range from requiring the tobacco industry to fund
smoking cessation programs to administering educational programs designed to prevent
minors from using tobacco. See, e.g., Amended Complaint, 1 208, American Tobacco Co.,
No. CL 95-1466-AO (Fla. Cir. Ct. Palm Beach County filed Aug. 7, 1996).
81. Moore & Mikhail, supra note 3. Mississippi Attorney General Moore suggests "the
states were left without a ... remedy at law .... The situation demanded that the states
resort to equitable theories of recovery." Moore & Mikhail, supra note 3.
[Vol. 19
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1. Unjust Enrichment
The common thread among all these actions is the idea of unjust
enrichment, a theory defined, somewhat circularly, as the "[g]eneral
principle that one person should not be permitted unjustly to enrich himself
at expense of another . *. .."" The remedy for unjust enrichment is
restitution. 3 In tobacco cases, the states argue that the tobacco industry
received enormous profits by selling tobacco to individual users who
subsequently developed serious health problems created by the tobacco. The
states then indirectly conferred a benefit upon the tobacco industry by
paying the tobacco users' health care costs through Medicaid, an expense
that should have been borne by the tobacco industry.' Thus, the states
argue, they are due restitution.
2. Conspiracy
An additional front of attack waged by the states focuses on an alleged
conspiracy within the tobacco industry to keep secret, for over forty years,
information regarding the dangers of tobacco use. 5 This conspiracy
allegedly extended to a sinister scheme to manipulate the levels of nicotine
in cigarettes in order to control addiction.86 Tobacco industry lawyers
purportedly stymied development of "safe cigarettes" in order to avoid the
inference that existing products were marketed despite knowledge of the
health risks.87 Plaintiffs in the Minnesota suit assert internal tobacco
industry papers were destroyed.8 These papers allegedly illustrated a
knowledge of the dangers of tobacco use.8 9
The conspiracy theory provides a mechanism by which the states hope
to avoid preemption. The allegations of conspiracy to conceal knowledge
of nicotine's addictive nature are not directly aimed at the quality of
warnings on tobacco products. Thus, they are not preempted by federal law
under the Cipollone analysis."
82. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1535 (6th ed. 1990).
83. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937).
84. Moore & Mikhail, supra note 3.
85. Henry Weinstein & Jack Nelson, Untested Theory Becoming Tobacco Firms' Top
Threat, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1996, at AI.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Philip Morris Documents Missing, UPI, Sept. 18, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, UPI File.
89. Id.




The claim of fraud is related to the conspiracy charge. The basic
elements of fraud common to most jurisdictions are a false statement of
material fact, knowledge that the statement is false, intent to induce reliance
on the statement, and reliance on the statement resulting in injury.9 The
fraud charge focuses on data published by the tobacco industry which
allegedly misstated facts known within the industry regarding nicotine's
addictive nature.
4. Negligent Undertaking of a Voluntary Duty
The states further assert that the tobacco industry, in response to
emerging information about the health risks involved with smoking, issued
public pronouncements indicating the tobacco industry's undertaking of a
duty to research and report on the health effects of smoking.9" When a
person voluntarily undertakes to render services necessary for the protection
of another person, the assumed duty must be performed with due care.93
Allegedly, the tobacco industry promulgated false reports, stifled publication
of research detrimental to tobacco interests, and suppressed development of
a safer cigarette.94
5. Other Theories
Some states have opted to pursue additional claims based on unreason-
ably dangerous design, public nuisance, or violation of state consumer
protection laws. Unreasonably dangerous design claims face the task of
overcoming comment i to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
91. Lance v. Wade, 457 So. 2d 1008, 1011 (Fla. 1984). See also, Kassab v. Michigan
Basic Property Ins. Assoc., 491 N.W.2d 545, 548 (Mich. 1992); Allen v. Mac Tools, Inc.,
671 So. 2d 636, 642 (Miss. 1996); New York v. Dean, 540 N.E.2d 707, 709 (N.Y. 1989).
92. Amended Complaint, 173-79. Florida v. American Tobacco Co., No.
CL-95-1466-AO (Fla. Cir. Ct., Palm Beach County filed Aug. 7, 1996).
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965). See, e.g., Silva v. Hodge, 583 So.
2d 231, 235 (Ala. 1991) (upholding finding of a voluntary undertaking to inspect an
injury-producing hazard); Lloyd v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 860 P.2d 1300, 1303 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1992).
94. Amended Complaint, IN 63-75, Florida v. American Tobacco Co., No.
CL-95-1466-AO (Fla. Cir. Ct., Palm Beach County filed Aug. 7, 1996).
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Torts,95 which specifically removes tobacco from its coverage.96 The
Restatement (Second) of Torts defines public nuisance as "an unreasonable
interference with a right common to the general public." 97  Plaintiffs
maintain the introduction of a dangerous product into the marketplace
constitutes a public nuisance. State consumer protection laws, which vary
according to jurisdiction, are statutory creations designed to protect
consumers at large.
B. Tactics & Procedure
1. Discovery
Success in the Medicaid recovery actions ultimately may depend in
large part on the limits placed on discovery. Tobacco companies will
attempt to force the states to identify each Medicaid recipient for whom the
state claims restitution.98 Defendants intend to use this information, along
with deposition testimony from the recipients, to controvert the question of
causation, that is, whether the state can prove tobacco caused the health
problems for which the recipient was treated.99 The states hope to restrict
this type of discovery in order to avoid the lengthy delays and exponential
increases in costs associated with such a massive project. Early indications
from Minnesota and Mississippi indicate the courts will allow limited
deposition discovery."
Notwithstanding these limitations on the defense, Minnesota has
successfully obtained over ten million pages of industry papers during
discovery."10 Plaintiffs are seeking access to internal industry documents in
an attempt to uncover the "smoking gun," thus proving industry insiders
95. Section 402A creates strict liability for "one who sells any product in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer .... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
96. Comment i specifically states "[g]ood tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely
because the effects of smoking may be harmful ...." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A cmt. i (1965).
97. Id. § 821B.
98. See Discovery Battle Still Rages In Mississippi's Medicaid Reimbursement Case, 10
Mealey's Litig. Rep.: Tobacco No. 11 (Oct. 3, 1996).
99. In Florida, the district court refused to allow the tobacco industry's discovery
request, finding that investigation and/or deposition of named Medicaid patients was not
necessary under the Florida Third Party Liability Act. State Can Submit Patient ID Numbers
in Medicaid Reimbursement Suit, Court Says, supra note 65.
100. Weinstein & Nelson, supra note 85. These courts issued orders allowing the
industry to take depositions from only twenty Medicaid recipients. Weinstein & Nelson,
supra note 85.
101. Weinstein & Nelson, supra note 85.
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conspired to conceal nicotine's addictive quality and manipulated nicotine
levels in order to promote addiction. 2
2. Procedure
The tobacco industry unsuccessfully attempted to remove some of the
cases from state court to federal court.0 3 The defendants argued that the
federal legislative requirement of a recovery provision against liable parties
brought the cases under federal question jurisdiction."° Tobacco companies
further argued that because the federal government would receive its share
of Medicaid payments from any successful state recovery, the federal
government was an "unnamed plaintiff with a real interest in the suit."'0 5
Courts rejected both arguments, finding the states were proceeding under
state law and were not acting as agents of, or suing on behalf of, the federal
government.1° 6
In some states the tobacco industry filed a preemptive suit seeking an
injunction against the filing of a restitution suit by the state." 7 The
preemptive strike by the industry in Connecticut federal court claimed the
Medicaid suit was unduly burdensome on interstate commerce, violative of
due process and equal protection guarantees, and inconsistent with the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution due to preemption.0" Courts have
uniformly rejected this tactic and refused to enjoin the Medicaid suits.1' 9
Connecticut District Court Judge Peter Dorsey applied the Younger"
abstention analysis"' when he dismissed the preemptive suit filed against
102. See Discovery Battle Still Rages In Mississippi's Medicaid Reimbursement Case, 10
Mealey's Litig. Rep.: Tobacco No. 11 (Oct. 3, 1996).
103. Federal courts in Connecticut, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Mississippi
have remanded suits back to state courts. Louisiana Medicaid Suit Remanded to State Court,
10 Mealey's Litig. Rep.: Tobacco No. 7 (Aug. 1, 1996).
104. Massachusetts v. Philip Morris Inc., 942 F. Supp. 690, 692 (D. Mass. 1996).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 696. See also Connecticut Medicaid Case Remanded Back to State Court, 10
Mealey's Litig. Rep.: Tobacco No. 13 (Nov. 1, 1996).
107. See, e.g., Philip Morris Inc. v. Blumenthal, No. 396CV01121 (D. Conn. filed
June 28, 1996); Philip Morris Inc., v. Harshbarger, No. 95-12574-GAO (D. Mass. filed Nov.
28, 1995); Philip Morris, Inc. v. Morales, No. 95-14807 (Tex. Dist. Ct., Travis County filed
Nov. 28, 1995). Maryland, New Jersey, Utah, and Hawaii were also targeted for preemptive
strikes. Andrew Blum, Tobacco Industry Tries Pre-emptive Lawsuits, NAT'L L.J.,
Sept. 23, 1996, at A6.
108. Complaint, 23, Philip Morris Inc., v. Blumenthal, No. 396CV01 121 (D. Conn.
filed June 28, 1996).
109. Andrew Blum, Tobacco Industry Tries Pre-emptive. Lawsuits, NAT'L L.J.,
Sept. 23, 1996, at A6.
110. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
111. Steven Fromm, Tobacco Takes A Hit, CoNN. L. TRIB., Jan. 6, 1997, at 1. Judge
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Attorney General Blumenthal, finding an important state interest was at
issue.
3. Parties
Although most of the defendants are the same in each case," 2 the
plaintiffs differ in two notable respects. In Minnesota, in addition to the
state, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota, a private entity, is a named
plaintiff."' Following a challenge to Blue Cross and Blue Shield's standing
to sue in Minnesota v. Philip Morris Inc.,"4 the Minnesota Supreme Court
found Blue Cross lacked standing to claim negligent undertaking of a
voluntary duty." 5 Conversely, the court found Blue Cross had standing to
pursue claims arising under the state consumer protection and antitrust
statutes." 6 The legislature was empowered to expand the breadth of
potential proper parties for the statutory causes of action; however, the tort
claim required more direct damages."
7
A second difference in plaintiffs involves the office responsible for
bringing the state's suit. In Mississippi, Governor Kirk Fordice filed suit to
prevent Attorney General Mike Moore from continuing to pursue the
Medicaid suit."' The Governor asserted that the Attorney General lacked
authority to act for the state in contravention of the Governor's expressed
policy as the state's chief executive officer." 9 A similar conflict exists in
Arizona between the Governor and Attorney General.
20
Dorsey determined an important state interest, Connecticut's fair trade act, was at issue and
the defendants had a fair opportunity for review of constitutional matters in the state court.
Although no state proceeding was underway when Philip Morris filed this suit, Judge Dorsey
determined that the Younger abstention doctrine was applicable due to the preemptive nature
of the filing. Id.
112. Defendant manufacturers include The American Tobacco Co., Liggett Group, Inc.,
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Philip Morris, Inc., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
Lorillard Tobacco Co., and United States Tobacco Co. Other defendants include the tobacco
trade associations, The Council for Tobacco Research-U.S.A. Inc., and The Tobacco
Institute, Inc., as well as the public relations firm Hill & Knowlton, Inc.
113. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota is a private non-profit Minnesota
corporation which "occupies a different niche . . . than that of indemnity or insurance
companies" due to a Minnesota statute allowing the creation of non-profit health service plan
corporations. Minnesota v. Philip Morris Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490, 495 (Minn. 1996).




118. Complaint, Fordice v. Moore, No. 96-M- 114 (Miss. filed Feb. 17, 1996).
119. Id. at 47.
120. Arizona AG Expands Suit Despite Governor's Push to Have It Dropped, 10
Mealey's Litig. Rep.: Tobacco No. 14 (Nov. 14, 1996). Although political wrangling clearly
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V. ARGUMENTS
Plaintiffs center this wave of tobacco suits around two major premises:
first, the state is an innocent plaintiff to which the personal responsibility
defense cannot attach; second, proof has surfaced that the tobacco industry
knew of the addictive nature of nicotine, failed to disclose this information,
and manipulated the nicotine level to influence tobacco users' behavior.'
The first premise is the foundation of the economic argument advanced by
the states in their equitable claims, while the second premise supports the
legal claims made by the states.
States claim standing through their status as Medicaid providers,
asserting economic injuries caused by the tobacco industry's conduct."2 The
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimate that public
programs, including Medicaid, paid for 43.3% of smoking caused expenses,
roughly ten billion dollars in 1987."2 A study conducted by the Center on
Addiction and Substance Abuse (CASA) at Columbia University found that
Medicaid spent three billion dollars in 1994 on inpatient hospital care
attributable to tobacco use.' 24
Plaintiffs also contend that the tobacco industry discovered the health
risks and the dangers of nicotine addiction yet failed to alert the public.
accounts for the animosity between the Democratic Attorney General in Mississippi and the
Republican Governor, both officers in Arizona are Republicans.
121. See, e.g., Jill Hodges, Tobacco Tenacious in the Courtroom; Industry has Flourished
Through Decades of Litigation, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Sept. 15, 1996, at
19A.
122. Not all the states have set a figure for damages, although those that have are asking
for tremendous sums. New Jersey claims $1.1 billion in annual costs for tobacco related
health care. Don Plummer, Billions at Stake as Lawsuits Force Showdown on Smoking,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Sept. 15, 1996, at 5D. Arizona will seek $500 million for past and
future expenses. Arizona to Seek Industry Compensation for Smoking-Related Health Care
Costs, 5 Health Law Rep. (BNA) 26, at D-10 (June 27, 1996); Connecticut will seek $1
billion. Thomas Scheffey & Steven Fromm, The Billion Dollar Gambit, CONN. L. TRIB., July
22, 1996, at 1; Maryland will seek $3 billion in compensatory damages and an additional
$10 billion in punitive damages. Maryland Sues Tobacco Industry, Connecticut Announces
Similar Plans, 7 Medicare Rep. (BNA) 19, at D-30, (May 10, 1996); Texas will seek $4
billion. Texas Suit Against Tobacco Industry Seeks to Recover $4 Billion in Costs, 7
Medicare Rep. (BNA) 14, at D-41 (April 5, 1996); Michigan seeks $2 billion in restitution,
$2 billion in anticipated future costs, and $10 billion punitive damages. Michigan Attorney
General Files $14 Billion Lawsuit Against Tobacco Companies, PR Newswire
(Aug. 21, 1996).
123. States Rush to File Medicaid Tobacco Suits, 20 WASH. HEALTH WEEK (Atlantic
Information Services, Inc.) No. 4 (Jun. 3, 1996).
124. Nicotine and Cigarettes: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the
Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994)
(statement of Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Chairman and President of the Center on Addiction and
Substance Abuse at Columbia University).
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Plaintiffs point to industry memoranda which supposedly uncover the
industry executives' awareness of the health risks and the conscious decision
to develop a public relations disinformation policy.'25 Proof of such a
conspiracy opens the door for the varied common law and statutory claims
made by the states. While these legal claims depend on the ability of the
plaintiffs to prove a conspiracy, the equitable claims face a more political
battle.
A. Economic Arguments
Plaintiffs' equitable claims are based on economics; however, the
defense prefers to concentrate on the issue of personal responsibility.
Although the risks of tobacco use have been widely publicized for thirty
years, tobacco users continue to indulge. Individuals bear the responsibility
for their own actions and should retain the freedom to exercise their own
discretion as to activities with potential health risks. Thus, tobacco users
cause injury to the states, not tobacco manufacturers.
Tobacco industry defense attorneys answer the plaintiffs' economic
arguments by citing the studies of economists who claim the tobacco
industry more than pays for health care costs through higher excise taxes.'26
One commonly cited study was conducted by W. Kip Viscusi, a Duke
University economist ("the Viscusi study").'2 7 The Viscusi study considered
the higher medical costs incurred by smokers, higher insurance premiums,
lost work time, and lost tax revenues due to smokers' earlier deaths. He then
balanced these costs against the savings realized in nursing home, pension,
and social security costs because of smokers' premature deaths. 2
According to Viscusi, the savings outweighed the costs by five cents per
pack of cigarettes, and once excise taxes were considered, the difference
increased nearly six times.'29 Clearly, arguments based on benefits accrued
through death are better left to economic theorists than to juries. However,
in an argument based solely on economics, such as a suit in restitution, the
cold figures are directly relevant. Using figures of the Office of Technology
125. Moore & Mikhail, supra note 3.
126. Laura Mansnerus, A Ghoulish Argument, MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL, May 19, 1996,
at 5B.
127. W. Kip Viscusi, CIGARETTE TAXATION AND THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF
SMOKING (1994), Working Paper Series of Nat'l Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
128. Smokers, who tend to die earlier than non-smokers, do not draw as much from
social security, Medicare, and pension programs, yet they pay the same amounts into such
programs. Jonathan Marshall, Smokers Paying Their Way, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 29, 1994, at
DI.
129. Mansnerus, supra note 126, citing Viscusi, supra note 127.
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Assessment (OTA) which estimate 1990 government spending totaled 8.9
billion dollars on costs directly associated with smoking, the tobacco
industry points to the 13.3 billion dollars in excise taxes collected on
cigarettes to support their theory that state tobacco revenues exceed state
health expenditures. 30
Plaintiffs assert that courts should not consider an "offset" based on
excise tax revenues, and, in Mississippi, have moved to disallow evidence
of the economic impact of smoking.' 3' The states insist taxes are general
revenues not subject to apportionment to health care cost, besides which the
taxes are paid by consumers, not the industries. 132
A secondary economic defense is the contribution the tobacco industry
makes to the national and local economies as an employer, taxpayer,
exporter, and investment option. American tobacco growers produce
roughly one billion pounds of tobacco annually, worth an estimated forty
seven billion retail dollars, and contribute thirteen billion dollars in federal,
state, and local excise taxes. 33  The economic impact of the tobacco
industry is widespread, affecting a diverse range of parties, from small
farmers to Wall Street investors.
34
Another question the states must answer is why, if tobacco is the evil
the states claim, tobacco is not legislatively banned under Tenth Amendment
police powers. The political answer may be that states have developed an
addiction to the enormous tax revenues the industry provides. 35 A more
attractive answer may be that political bodies are reluctant to infringe on
130. States Rush to File Medicaid Tobacco Suits, 20 WASH. HEALTH WEEK (Atlantic
Information Services, Inc.) No. 4 (Jun. 3, 1996).
131. Moore & Mikhail, supra note 3.
132. Moore & Mikhail, supra note 3. Attorney General Moore asserts that as consumers,
not the alleged tortfeasor, pay the taxes, the collateral source rule is applicable. The
collateral source rule prohibits consideration of collateral sources of revenue or compensation
in awarding damages. Thus, the rule allows double recovery where compensation is already
received from a source other than the tortfeasor. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 292 (6th
ed. 1990). In effect, this rule then serves a punitive, not compensatory, function, and is
thereby inconsistent with a restitutionary basis of recovery.
133. Debbie Price, Maryland Tobacco Farms See Cloudy Horizon, BALT. SUN,
Sept. 18, 1996, at IA.
134. For example, when the Florida Circuit Court Judge dismissed fifteen of the eighteen
counts in Florida's amended complaint on September 16, 1996, tobacco stocks received a
boost the following day, including Philip Morris rising 2 1/8 and R.J. Reynolds rising Y2.
Tobacco, Computer Stocks Register Solid Market Gains, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Sept. 18, 1996, at 6D. Between August 8 and December 15, 1996 Philip Morris stock rose
26 percent, while over the same period R.J. Reynolds stock rose 20 percent. Cathleen Egan,
Tobacco Stocks Up Again, THE CORMER-JOURNAL, Dec. 15, 1996, at 5E.
135. The Tobacco Institute claims that cigarette excise taxes are over $13 billion
annually. States Rush to File Medicaid Tobacco Suits, 20 WASH. HEALTH WEEK 4
(June 3, 1996).
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individual freedoms. Public opinion polls tend to support this type of
common sense reasoning, suggesting the public still strongly favors personal
responsibility and harbors an abiding distrust of too much governmental
intrusion.136 The tobacco defendants also are quick to point to the fact that
state legislatures have regulated the industry by licensing the sale of tobacco
and setting minimum age requirements, thus impliedly condoning the sale
of tobacco within regulation limits.'37
B. Policy Oriented Arguments
A major argument against allowing states to proceed against the
tobacco companies on the basis of Medicaid restitution is the precedential
impact of such a suit. If the states' claims are accepted by the courts, the
states would then be free to launch assaults against other products that fall
into public disfavor. The logical extension is to proceed against alcohol. 3 '
Certainly the same arguments advanced by the states against the tobacco
companies apply to alcohol distributors. Indeed, the same reasoning behind
the Medicaid suits applies equally to products such as milkshakes,
cheeseburgers, and other high-fat foods with negative or minimal nutritional
value. 39 Indigents require treatment for health problems caused by poor diet
just as surely as they require treatment for smoking related health problems.
Yet few can imagine a suit filed by the state against the fast food industry
based simply on statistics showing the effects of high cholesterol diets. This
136. Wayne Slater, Most in Polls Oppose State Tobacco Suit, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Jun. 30, 1996, at IA. Slater cites a June, 1996 poll conducted by the Office of Survey
Research of the University of Texas indicating 63% of those polled oppose the state's
Medicaid restitution suit, while roughly one-third supported the suit. Eighty percent of those
polled opposed individuals filing suit against the tobacco industry to recover for medical
expenses, while only 16% supported such suits. Id.
137. Arizona Files Suit Against the Tobacco Industry, HEALTHLINE (Aug. 21, 1996).
138. Florida's Governor has said this type of action will be limited to tobacco; however,
his general counsel, Dexter Douglas, when asked about alcohol, was quoted as saying, "At
this point, we don't have the statistics to proceed in that regard .... You gotta take 'em one
at a time." Carolyn Lochhead, The Growing Power of Trial Lawyers, 2 WEEKLY STANDARD
No. 2, at 21 (Sept. 23, 1996).
139. Mississippi's Attorney General Moore glossed over such arguments when he noted,
"[D]espite potential for high fat content, milk contains calcium and beef has protein. Nothing
in tobacco is good for human health." Moore & Mikhail, supra note 3. Attorney General
Moore's statement is directly contradicted by Food and Drug Administration research
indicating nicotine helps weight loss, speeds the metabolism, and curbs appetites. CNN
Today (CNN television broadcast, Feb. 10, 1997). Other researchers go further by suggesting
nicotine may help prevent Parkinson's disease and Alzheimer's disease in addition to being
a possible treatment for some other neurological disorders. Doug Thomas, Studies Hint that
Nicotine Helps, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Jan. 20, 1997, at 28.
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result lies somewhere down the slippery slope which begins with tobacco
suits.
Caffeine provides an illustrative example. The long term health effects
of daily doses of caffeine are subject to debate. Currently, caffeine is a
socially acceptable drug, widely used despite possible deleterious effects. If
caffeine is more definitively linked to a specific debilitation, states might
then be obliged to pursue the coffee, tea, and soft drink industries.
Following the lead of the tobacco restitution suits, attempts to recover
retroactively clearly would be proper.
VI. POLITICAL ASPECTS
The political aspects behind these suits cannot be overlooked.
Partisanship accounts for some of the attacks. Thirteen of the first seventeen
state actions were initiated by democratic attorneys general.'" In Missis-
sippi, the Republican Governor, Kirk Fordice, sued the Democratic Attorney
General, Mike Moore, to prevent the Attorney General from carrying on a
suit against the tobacco companies. 4 ' These partisan actions have followed
traditional battle lines between stereotypical pro-industry conservatives and
pro-government-intervention liberals. Because tobacco has provided
campaign funds to politicians from both sides of the aisle, the effect of
partisanship is limited.
Perhaps the most intriguing political aspect of these suits is the use of
private plaintiffs attorneys hired pursuant to contingency fee agreements.
By employing outside counsel, attorneys general hope to avoid a drain on
state coffers while still securing a chance at some recovery. As the potential
recovery is in the hundreds of millions of dollars in each state,'42 the
attorneys chosen to represent the states stand to earn significant fees.
Significantly, there appear to be no restrictions on the ability of some
attorneys general to appoint the outside counsel.'43 This has led to charges
of political favoritism and cronyism.'" States note the specialized nature of
140. Democratic Attorneys General filed the first ten suits, in Mississippi, Minnesota,
West Virginia, Florida, Massachusetts, Louisiana, Texas, Maryland, Washington, and
Connecticut respectively. Republican Attorney Generals have since filed suits in Kansas,
Arizona, New Jersey, and Illinois.
141. Complaint, Fordice v. Moore, No. 96-M- 114 (Miss. filed Feb. 17, 1996).
142. See supra, note 122 for a listing of damages sought in various states.
143. Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas are identified as states which do not use
competitive bidding. Locbhead, supra note 138.
144. Mississippi's Attorney General is identified as having "awarded the lead portion of
the tobacco contract to his top campaign contributor." Lochhead, supra note 138.
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the proceedings and argue that top legal talent is required for such complex
litigation, making competitive bidding impractical.' 45
Allowing the attorney general to appoint outside counsel at his
discretion, and thus avoid financial restraints on the office, provides
dangerous precedent. The attorney general is effectively given policy
making power beyond the constraints of the office. If tobacco may be
arbitrarily attacked in this fashion, then the attorney general is given the
authority to crusade against whatever industry he chooses, and the power of
the state's chief executive, as well as that of the legislature, is diminished."4
VII. CONCLUSION
As the tobacco suits are similar in nature, the results of the first few
suits should set the trend for the rest of the country.147 Florida's Palm
Beach County Circuit Court dealt a blow to the theory of an independent
cause of action for the state, absent specific statutory authority, when it held
that Florida must proceed under a subrogation basis for claims prior to the
enactment of Florida's Medicaid Third Party Liability Act.4 ' Following this
ruling, the tobacco industry moved to dismiss suits in Texas and Maryland
based on the failure to include subrogation based claims. 49 In West
Virginia, common law claims were dismissed by the circuit court, which
found that the plaintiff lacked the ability to sue except on statutorily
identified grounds. 5' The legal claims of the states depend simply on the
ability of the plaintiffs to prove a conspiracy. The danger in these suits lies
in the restitution claims.
The judicial branch is not the arm of government charged with
promulgating commercial regulations. That power is expressly reserved for
the legislative branch of government.' 5 ' If the individual state legislatures
find the costs of tobacco are burdening society, the legislatures are
145. Lochhead, supra note 138.
146. Texas's Attorney General is reportedly considering using outside counsel in
environmental suits. Lochhead, supra note 138.
147. Mississippi has the first scheduled trial date, March 24, 1997. States Rush to File
Medicaid Tobacco Suits, 20 WASH. HEALTH WEEK (Atlantic Information Services, Inc.) No. 4
(Jun. 3, 1996).
148. Many Pre-1994 Claims DismissedFrom Florida's Medicaid Recovery Case, 10
Mealey's Litig. Rep.: Tobacco 10 (Sept. 19, 1996).
149. Industry Pushes Dismissal of 11 Texas .Case Counts, 10 Mealey's Litig. Rep. No.
16 (Dec. 19, 1996); Subrogation, Assignment Only Remedies Industry Says in Seeking
Dismissal of Maryland Medicaid Case, 10 Mealey's Litig. Rep. No. 16 (Dec. 19, 1996).
150. Court Says State Agencies Can't Sue Tobacco Firms to Recoup Medicaid Money,
Health Care Daily (BNA), (Feb. 19, 1997).
151. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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empowered to levy additional taxes, or if the burden is great enough, the
legislatures may prohibit the sale of tobacco entirely pursuant to their police
powers.
Tobacco is a popular target in the present political climate, but the
procedures created to attack tobacco cannot be legitimately limited solely to
tobacco once they are put in place. Other products are necessarily subject
to the same type of attack. Governmental intrusion into areas of purely
personal conduct, such as the use of tobacco, is unwarranted and unneces-
sary. The government cannot hope to mandate proper diet, reasonable
exercise routines, or healthy lifestyles. Such encroachment into personal
freedom simply is not a proper function of government. If the courts accept
the restitutionary theory offered by the anti-tobacco forces, the back door
will be opened to governmental action against virtually any type of product,
despite legislatively set public policy.
Cliff Sherrill
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